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TRADE DRESS PROTECTION: INHERENT
DISTINCTIVENESS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO
SECONDARY MEANING
INTRODUCTION
Trade dress is the overall appearance or the "look" of a product.1
Although originally limited to a product's package, the concept of trade
dress now includes the design of a product itself.2 One court has defined
it as "the total image of a product[, which] may include features such as
size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics, or even partic-
ular sales techniques."3 In analyzing trade dress, the elements of the
product's appearance must not be isolated and examined individually,
but must be considered as a whole.4
Trade dress is a more expansive term than trademark.5 A trade dress,
nevertheless, may be federally registered as a trademark on either the
1. See, e.g., Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268, 1274
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 260 (1988); Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others,
Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 1987); Freixenet, S.A. v. Admiral Wine & Liquor Co.,
731 F.2d 148, 152-53 (3d Cir. 1984).
Some of the leading trade dress cases involve restaurant decor. See, e.g., Fuddruckers,
826 F.2d at 839; Prufrock Ltd. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 130 (8th Cir. 1986). A mark
applied to a restaurant is considered a service mark, rather than a trademark. 1 J. Mc-
Carthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 19:30, at 937-38 (2d ed. 1984 & Supp.
1988). A service mark is "used in the sale or advertising of services to identify and distin-
guish the services of one person, including a unique service, from the services of others
and to indicate the source of the services, even if that source is unknown." Lanham Act
§ 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Service marks may be registered, and
they receive the same treatment and protections as trademarks. See Lanham Act § 3, 15
U.S.C. § 1053 (1982). The trade dress of a service, such as restaurant decor, should be
treated the same as the trade dress of a product. See Fuddruckers, 826 F.2d at 841;
Prufrock, 781 F.2d 132. Therefore, this Note does not distinguish between the trade
dress of a service and that of a product.
2. See S. Kane, Trademark Law: A Practitioner's Guide 43 (1987) ("Product design
as well as product packaging and labeling are now all referred to as trade dress."); see,
e.g., LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1985) ("the design of a
product itself may function as its packaging ... and hence be protectable trade dress");
Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg., 685 F.2d 78, 80 n.2 (3d Cir. 1982) (packaging and
appearance of "Rubik's Cube" considered trade dress).
3. AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1535 (1lth Cir. 1986) (quoting John
Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (1 1th Cir. 1983)), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1041 (1987). But see Prufrock Ltd. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 131-32 (8th Cir. 1986)
("method and style of doing business" excluded from definition of trade dress).
4. See, e.g., LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 1985); Fal-
con Rice Mill, Inc. v. Community Rice Mill, Inc., 725 F.2d 336, 347 (5th Cir. 1984);
Fabrica, Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 894 (9th Cir. 1983).
5. See M. Kramer Mfg. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 448 n.25 (4th Cir. 1986). A
trademark is "any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted
and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify and distinguish his goods, including
a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source
of the goods, even if that source is unknown." Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982
& Supp. V 1987). For definitions and examples of types of trademarks, see infra notes 75-
76.
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Principal Register6 or Supplemental Register7 if the trade dress meets the
requirements for trademark registration.' Trade dress, however, often
remains unregistered because the trade dress contains functional features
or was not originally intended to identify the source.9 Although an un-
registered trademark lacks the presumed validity of a registered trade-
mark, it may still be protected from infringement if it has either
"secondary meaning" or "inherent distinctiveness. 10 In the case of an
unregistered trade dress, the courts do not agree whether the same re-
quirements must be met for protection or whether a different test is
appropriate. 1
This Note discusses whether trade dress should be protected from un-
authorized use when it has no secondary meaning but is inherently dis-
tinctive. Part I examines the legislation covering trade dress protection
and how courts have interpreted this legislation. Part I then examines
6. Registration on the Principal Register requires submission of an application and
fee to the United States Patent & Trademark Office and a mark that: (I) meets the Lan-
ham Act definition of trademark; (2) is in actual use in interstate commerce; (3) is "af-
fixed" to the goods, and (4) is not barred from registration by Lanham Act § 2, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052 (1982). 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 19:6, at 884-85. Section 2 of the Lanham
Act bars the registration of marks comprising, for example, immoral matter, the flag of
the United States, or the name of a living person without his consent. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052 (1982).
7. Registration on the Supplemental Register requires merely that a mark be "capa-
ble of distinguishing the applicant's goods or services." 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 1,
§ 19:8, at 886. It is not necessary that the mark actually indicate origin, only that it is
capable of doing so over time. See id. § 19:8B, at 889; S. Kane, supra note 2, at 78.
United States trademark registration is a prerequisite to obtaining trademark registration
and protection in many foreign countries. A basic purpose of the Supplemental Register
is to provide such registration. 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 19:8, at 886. A mark may
not be registered on the Supplemental Register if it is eligible for registration on the
Principal Register. Id. § 19:8F, at 891. Registration on the Supplemental Register ex-
cludes a mark from certain advantages of registration on the Principal Register such as
prima facie evidence of the exclusive right to use a mark and constructive notice of a
claim of ownership. Id. § 19:8A, at 887.
8. See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1336 (C.C.P.A. 1982);
Schuman, Trademark Protection of Container and Package Configurations-A Primer, 59
Chi.[-]Kent L. Rev. 779, 794-97 (1982).
9. See S. Kane, supra note 2, at 43; 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 19:8, at 889;
Schuman, supra note 8, at 796-97; Strimbeck, The Developing Federal Law on the Protec-
tion of Product Trade Dress Under the Lanham Act, 15 USC Sec. 1127, 23 N.H. B. J. 85,
85-86 (1982). A merchant or manufacturer may not think to immediately register a trade
dress as a trademark because his goal may have been simply to create an attractive or
practical package rather than an indicator of the product's source. See Schuman, supra
note 8, at 800; Strimbeck, supra, at 88.
10. See 2 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 27:3, at 348 (2d ed.
1984 & Supp. 1988). For an explanation of "secondary meaning," see infra notes 23-29
and accompanying text. For an explanation of "inherent distinctiveness," see infra notes
36-42 and accompanying text.
11. See Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 517 n.2 (10th Cir. 1987);
Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 843 (9th Cir. 1987); see also I
J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 8:2, at 287 ("important break with the traditional rule");
Ropski & Johnson, A "'Nonobvious" Framework for Analyzing Proof of Secondary Mean-
ing, 11 Am. Pat. L. A. Q. J. 211, 221 (1983) (discussing split of authority).
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the inherent distinctiveness and secondary meaning tests as they apply to
the two components of trade dress, product design and package design.
Part II analyzes whether the inherent distinctiveness test can properly be
used to protect product design as trade dress, given the distinctions
among trademark, copyright and patent laws. Part III applies the same
analysis to whether package design can receive trade dress protection
under the inherent distinctiveness test. This Note concludes that inher-
ent distinctiveness is a proper test for protecting a trade dress of package
design from infringement but not for protection of the design of a prod-
uct itself.
I. TRADE DRESS PROTECTION
A. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
The Lanham Act governs trademark registration and protection. 12
Congress enacted the Lanham Act to serve two primary purposes. The
first is to protect the consuming public from counterfeit or imitated
marks and false trade descriptions so that consumers actually receive the
products they desire.13 Second, the Act protects the manufacturers' and
merchants' goodwill and their investment of "energy, time, and money"
from "misappropriation by pirates and cheats." 14
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 5 codifies the federal unfair competi-
tion law, which includes the protection of trade dress from infringe-
ment. 6 A successful claim for trade dress infringement under section
43(a) requires proof of three elements. First, the trade dress must be
12. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
13. See S. Rep. No! 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.
Code Cong. Serv. 1274, 1274-76.
14. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1274, 1274. An additional ob-
jective of the Lanham Act is to defeat monopolies and stimulate competition through the
limited protections offered by a trademark. Id. at 3-4, reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Cong.
Serv. 1274, 1274-75. For a comparison of trademark restrictions on competition with the
monopolies granted by patents and copyrights, see infra notes 46-51 and accompanying
text.
15. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides in pertinent part:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or de-
vice, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact,
which... is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to
the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or
as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or com-
mercial activities by another person ... shall be liable in a civil action by any
person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 132, 102 Stat. 3946, reprinted in 1988 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)).
16. See, e.g., American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136,
1140 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[Section] 43(a) provides a cause of action for unprivileged imita-
tion, including trade dress infringement."); 1 J. Gilson, Trademark Protection and Prac-
tice § 7.02, at 7-7 (1987) ("[section 43(a)] prohibits use of a confusingly similar... [tirade
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nonfunctional. 17 Second, the trade dress of the competitor's product
must be so similar to the trade dress of plaintiff's product that confusion
as to the product's source is likely.18 Courts agree on these first two
elements but are split on the third requirement.19 A number of courts
require that the trade dress have acquired "secondary meaning,"'20 while
other courts require that the trade dress either have "secondary mean-
ing" or be "inherently distinctive."'2 1
B. Secondary Meaning and Inherent Distinctiveness
The traditional approach to trade dress protection, steadfastly fol-lowed by a number of courts of appeals, requires that the trade dresshave "secondary meaning."22 Secondary meaning is the mental associa-
dress"); I J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 8:1, at 284 ("[section] 43(a) has often been used as
a vehicle by which to assert trade dress protection").Although trade dress infringement certainly comes under section 43(a), disagreement
exists as to whether trade dress infringement qualifies as a "false designation of origin" or
as a "false representation." Trade dress infringement has often been deemed a "falsedesignation of origin." Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1216(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); see, e.g., Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs.,Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 863 (1982) (White, J., concurring) (confusingly similar product orpackage design may be a "false designation of origin"); Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit ReelCo., 832 F.2d 513, 516 (10th Cir. 1987) (action under section 43(a) for injury caused by
"false designation of origin"); Stormy Clime Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 974(2d Cir. 1987) ("false designation of origin" linked to trade dress protection).A contrary argument has been made that "false designation of origin" refers to geo-graphic origin only, not source of manufacture, and therefore it is not a valid basis fortrade dress protection. See Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, 659F.2d 695, 700 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982); KeystoneCamera Prods. Corp. v. Ansco Photo-Optical Prods. Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1221, 1224 &
n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Germain, Unfair Trade Practices Under Section 43(a) of the LanhamAct: You've Come a Long Way, Baby-Too Far, Maybe?, 49 Ind. L.J. 84, 109-12 (1973).Alternatively, trade dress protection has been granted under the "false representation"
component of section 43(a). See Chevron, 659 F.2d at 701-02; Keystone, 667 F. Supp. at1224. But see Germain, supra, at 111-12 (use of "false representation" limited to marks
that falsely represent a characteristic of a product).
17. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 517 (10th Cir. 1987);First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1987); StormyClime Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 974 (2d Cir. 1987); AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft,Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1535 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); AmericanGreetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1141 (3d Cir. 1986).If a trade dress is "essential to the use or purpose of the article or... affects the cost orquality," it is functional and fails the first requirement. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. IvesLabs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n. 10 (1982). For a thorough discussion of functionality, seeNote, The Problem of Functional Features: Trade Dress Infringement Under Section43(a) of the Lanham Act, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 77 (1982).
18. See, e.g., Brunswick, 832 F.2d at 516-17; AmBrit, 812 F.2d at 1535; First Brands,809 F.2d at 1381; Stormy Clime, 809 F.2d at 974; American Greetings, 807 F.2d at 1141.19. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
20. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.22. See, e.g., First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir.1987); Stormy Clime Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 974 (2d Cir. 1987); AmericanGreetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1141 (3d Cir. 1986); PrufrockLtd. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 132 (8th Cir. 1986); Kwik-Site Corp. v. Clear View Mfg.,
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tion by a substantial part of the consuming public of a product's trade
dress with its source, whether that source is known or unknown.23 Sec-
ondary meaning results from "long use and favorable acceptance" 24 and
is acquired when a trade dress is associated with a single source, not just
with the product itself.2 5 Examples of trade dress found to have secon-
dary meaning include the color and shape of antifreeze bottles,26 "tummy
graphics" on teddy bears,27 and restaurant decor.2 8 Once secondary
meaning has been acquired, the combination of features constituting a
trade dress is protected. 9
The original "source" need not actually produce or sell goods that
have been "copied" to claim infringement of its trade dress; the trade
dress need only acquire secondary meaning causing consumers to iden-
tify an infringer's product with a particular source.30 For example, the
unauthorized production of a toy car that was modeled after a car in a
popular television series, "The Dukes of Hazard," violated section 43(a)
because consumers identified the toy car with the source of the television
series, not with the toy manufacturer.
The Fifth Circuit departed from the accepted approach of trade dress
protection by holding that proof of secondary meaning is not necessary
for an "inherently distinctive" trade dress.32  Other courts have em-
ployed this rule.33 Under this approach, inherent distinctiveness func-
tions as an alternative test for trade dress protection and not as a
758 F.2d 167, 178 (6th Cir. 1985); Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 378
(Ist Cir. 1980).
23. See, e.g., Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doe's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 843 (9th
Cir. 1987); AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1536 n.14 (11th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 15:2, at 658-66.
24. Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 777 (9th Cir. 1981);
see Black & Decker Mfg. v. Ever-Ready Appliance Mfg., 684 F.2d 546, 550 (8th Cir.
1982).
25. See LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 78 (2d Cir. 1985). For an
explanation of when a trade dress denotes a product and when it denotes a source, see
Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Bolar Phar. Co., 747 F.2d 844, 856-58 (3d Cir. 1984) (Giles, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1137 (1985).
26. See First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1383 (9th Cir. 1987).
27. See American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1139,
1144 (3d Cir. 1986).
28. See Prufrock Ltd. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 132 (8th Cir. 1986).
29. See American Greetings, 807 F.2d at 1144.
30. See Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 332-34 (2d Cir. 1983).
31. See id. at 334.
32. See Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, 659 F.2d 695, 702-03
(5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982); 1 J. McCarthy, supra note
1, § 8:2, at 287.
33. See, e.g., AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1535-37 (11th Cir. 1986) (ice
cream bar wrapper held inherently distinctive), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Blau
Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 1986) (secondary mean-
ing not required "if the trade dress is a distinctive, identifying mark"); J.M. Huber Corp.
v. Lowery Wellheads, Inc., 778 F.2d 1467, 1469-70 (10th Cir. 1985) (inherent distinctive-
ness test applied to alphanumeric symbols used on a label).
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replacement for the secondary meaning test. 34 Accordingly, if trade
dress either has acquired secondary meaning or is inherently distinctive,
it may not be copied with impunity.35
In contrast to secondary meaning, inherent distinctiveness does not
require public exposure over a long period of time.36 To be inherently
distinctive, a product must have certain intrinsic characteristics that dis-
tinguish it and immediately become an indication of source.3 7 Courts
have found trade dress that is "arbitrary or fanciful, and not descriptive
or functional" to be inherently distinctive. 3' Examples include the wrap-
per of the Klondike ice cream bar,3 9 packaging for Ortho agricultural
chemicals,' "emotionally expressive non-occasion greeting card[s],"'
and slippers in the shape of bear paws.42
II. PRODUCT DESIGN AND THE ROLES OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAWS
The scope of trade dress protection, originally limited to a product's
package, has grown over the years to include the design and appearance
of the product itself.43 As a result of this expansion, the range of trade
dress protection has gradually crept into the domains of other intellec-
tual property laws, such as copyrights and design patents." Although
patent, copyright and trademark protection may be claimed for a single
product,45 fundamental distinctions exist among the various forms of in-
34. See, e.g., Vaughan Mfg. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 348 (7th Cir. 1987)
("[s]econdary meaning need not be shown where the trade dress, by itself, is a distinctive,
identifying mark, but must be shown where.., the trade dress is not inherently distinc-
tive"); AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1535 (11th Cir. 1986) ("plaintiff must
prove [that] its trade dress is inherently distinctive or has acquired secondary meaning"),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); cf Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513,
517 n.2 (10th Cir. 1987) (inherent distinctiveness not considered since secondary meaning
not challenged).
35. See Sno-Wizard Mfg. v. Eisemann Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423, 428 n.5 (5th Cir.
1986) (quoting 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 15:3, at 667).
36. See Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 426 n.7 (5th Cir. 1984).
37. Id.; see Vaughan Mfg. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 348 (7th Cir. 1987).
38. Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 425 n.3; see Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing
Groups, 659 F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126
(1982). For factors commonly used to determine the inherent distinctiveness of a trade
dress and examples of their applications, see infra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
39. See AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1536 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
40. See Chevron, 659 F.2d at 703.
41. Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1533, 1536 (D. Colo.
1986), aff'd, 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 260 (1988).
42. See Animal Fair, Inc. v. Amfesco Indus., 620 F. Supp. 175, 190 (D. Minn. 1985),
aff'd, 794 F.2d 678 (8th Cir. 1986).
43. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
44. The reader should keep in mind that a functionality test also must be applied to
determine trade dress protection and that the discussion here only pertains to trade dress
that is nonfunctional. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
45. See S. Kane, supra note 2, at 7; 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 6:1, at 147.
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tellectual property law.46 The basic purpose of trademark law is to pre-
vent others from using a mark if it is likely to cause confusion as to a
product's source.47 In contrast, copyright law aims primarily to prevent
deliberate, substantial copying of an original work that is in a tangible
form.48 A design patent stops others from making, using and selling,49
"any new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufac-
ture."50 The periods of protection for trademarks, copyrights and pat-
ents vary according to the degrees of restrictions imposed on competition
by each; copyrights and patents restrict competition to greater degrees
than trademarks and, therefore, offer protection for shorter periods.51
The distinctions among copyrights, patents, and trademarks must be
maintained.52 Although some products may meet the criteria for protec-
tion by copyright, patent, and trademark laws, trademark protection
must not be given to the kinds of products that only meet the criteria for
protection by copyright or patent laws so that the greater protections
offered by copyright and patent laws are not extended for the potentially
limitless trademark time period. 3
The problem is illustrated by Animal Fair, Inc. v. Amfesco Industries,
Inc.," which involved novelty slippers in the shape of bear claws. In
Animal Fair, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the manufacture and promo-
tion of a similar slipper by a competitor and brought an action for viola-
tions of copyright and unfair competition laws.55 The court held that
there was likelihood of success on the merits in both the copyright56 and
section 43(a) claims.5 7 Because the issue was the deliberate and substan-
46. See 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 6:2, at 148-49.
47. See Lanham Act § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
48. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 106 (1982).
49. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1982).
50. Id. § 171.
51. Trademarks provide the least protection for a product; a trademark owner may
bar use of a mark by another only if there is likelihood of public confusion as to the
product's source. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Trademark status can
last virtually forever. See Lanham Act § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 1059 (1982) (trademark registra-
tion renewable every twenty years).
A copyright allows the author to bar the intentional copying of his copyrighted work
and therefore offers a greater degree of protection than a trademark. See 17 U.S.C.
§§ 106, 501 (1982). However, a copyright lasts a shorter period, generally life of the
author plus fifty years. See id. § 302(a). Works for hire receive copyright protection for
seventy-five years from first publication or one hundred years from first creation, which-
ever is earlier. See id. at § 302(c).
A design patent restricts competition to the greatest degree because it gives the patent
holder the right to bar anyone from making, using or selling the patented item. See 35
U.S.C. § 271 (1982). It endures only fourteen years. Id. § 173. Trademark protection
may exist independently during or after the copyright or patent period. See 1 J. McCar-
thy, supra note 1, § 6:3, at 156-57; infra note 67.
52. See 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 6:2, at 147-48.
53. See id. § 6:2, at 148-49.
54. 620 F. Supp. 175 (D. Minn. 1985), aff'd, 794 F.2d 678 (8th Cir. 1986).
55. Id. at 177.
56. See id. at 189.
57. See id. at 191.
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tial copying of a product design, the copyright action would have given
the plaintiff's product design sufficient protection from imitation, espe-
cially considering the short duration of the market for novelty items.58
However, the court went on to find a violation of section 43(a) as well,
holding that the slippers met both the inherent distinctiveness and secon-
dary meaning tests for trade dress protection. 9 The successful plaintiff
thus had the right to the exclusive manufacture of bear-claw slippers of
the type which he had designed not only for the copyright period of life
of the author plus fifty years but also, under trademark law, for as long as
he desired, potentially forever.
In Animal Fair, the court granted trademark status to the design of a
product itself because the court found the design inherently distinctive.'
This essentially gives the product design protection beyond that intended
by trademark law.6 1 Providing protection for a product design because
of its originality matches the basic purposes of patent and copyright laws
more exactly than that of trademark law, which is concerned with pro-
tecting the identity of sources of goods.6 2 Originality is an essential ele-
ment for copyright and design patent protections,63 and a distinctive
product design should be evaluated under those laws rather than under
the inherent distinctiveness standard applicable to trade dress." Apply-
ing the inherent distinctiveness test under trademark law to product de-
sign results not only in the prevention of unfair competition but also in
the prevention of any competition at all in a product deemed inherently
distinctive.65
When a product design acquires secondary meaning, however, a suffi-
cient basis exists to give that product trademark status and protection.
The heavy burden of proving secondary meaning ensures the existence of
a strong connection in the public's mind between a product and a
source. 66 While the inherent distinctiveness test permits the first manu-
facturer or merchant who comes out with an inherently distinctive trade
dress to claim protection, the secondary meaning test does not entitle the
manufacturer or merchant to protection simply by coming out with a
58. See id. at 183 (two year maximum market for novelty items).
59. See id. at 190.
60. Id.
61. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
62. 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 6:2, at 148-49.
63. See supra notes 48, 50 and accompanying text. The term "originality" has differ-
ent meanings under copyright and patent laws. The copyright originality requirement is
met more easily by "almost any independent effort." See 1 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer,
Nimmer on Copyright § 2.01[B], at 2-11 to 2-15 (1988). Originality in the patent sense
requires novelty and must go beyond the prior art in a way that is not obvious. See 35
U.S.C. § 103 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
64. See infra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
65. Application of the inherent distinctiveness test to package and display design does
not present this problem because of the infinite variety of alternatives available. See infra
notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 99-115 and accompanying text.
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product first.67 Unlike inherent distinctiveness, secondary meaning is a
rigorous test based on empirical proof that a trade dress has become an
indicator of source.6" A product design meeting this test should be given
trademark protection, in spite of the resulting restrictions on competi-
tion, in order to promote the purpose of the Lanham Act-the preven-
tion of confusion in the marketplace as to a product's source.69
Copyright protection, although it would not restrict competition as
much, would not provide the full protection the Lanham Act was meant
to give a definite identifier of source.
III. THE INHERENT DISTINCTIVENESS TEST AND PACKAGE DESIGN
Although inherent distinctiveness is not an appropriate test for the
protection of product design, it is a valid test for package design. With
respect to package design, the application of trademark law to trade
dress is appropriate because of the similarities between trademarks and
trade dress. In addition, protecting an inherently distinctive package de-
sign does not violate the principles of unfair competition, but rather such
protection is supported by them.
A. Application of Trademark Law to Package Design
In applying the inherent distinctiveness test for the first time in a trade
dress case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied the same
standards that are employed in trademark cases.70 While a number of
courts base the application of section 43(a) to trade dress on unfair com-
petition,71 other courts have brought trade dress within the realm of
trademarks by holding that section 43(a) protects trade dress that has
attained the status of an unregistered trademark.72
Under trademark law, inherently distinctive symbols and designs can
be registered and protected as trademarks without proof of secondary
67. A trade dress could have copyright protection or could be granted a design patent
and, during the period of patent or copyright protection, develop sufficient secondary
meaning to have trademark protection. See In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 372 F.2d
539, 543, 545 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Smith, J., concurring) (design patent laws and trademark
laws independent and not in conflict); 17 U.S.C. § 301(d) (1982) ("Nothing in this title
annuls or limits any rights or remedies under any other Federal statute.").
68. See infra notes 100-15 and accompanying text.
69. See In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1051 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J.,
concurring).
70. See Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, 659 F.2d 695, 702 (5th
Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982).
71. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 517 (10th Cir. 1987)
(trade dress may be "so distinctive as to become an unregistered trademark eligible for
protection under the Lanham Act"); Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d
604, 608 (7th Cir. 1986) ("there is probably no substantive legal difference between [the]
terms [trade dress and trademark]"; "courts have generally not thought it important
whether trade dress is a form of trademark; but it is"); LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp.,
754 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1985) (" 'trade dress' of a product... may become an unregis-
tered trademark").
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meaning.73 "[T]rademark law requires a demonstration of 'secondary
meaning' only when the claimed trademark is not sufficiently distinctive
of itself to identify the producer."'74 Terms, symbols and designs that
require secondary meaning include descriptive terms, geographically de-
scriptive terms, personal names, grade or quality designations, slogans
and literary titles.75 Inherently distinctive trademarks include arbitrary,
fanciful and suggestive marks.76 Generic terms lack the capacity for in-
herent distinctiveness and secondary meaning and therefore can never be
trademarks.77 Because trade dress protection is often based on the the-
ory that a trade dress is an unregistered trademark, the principles of
trademark law should apply to trade dress.7" As the Court of Appeals
73. See Chevron, 659 F.2d at 702; 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 7:7, at 196.
74. Chevron, 659 F.2d at 702.
75. 1 J. Gilson, supra note 16, § 2.09, at 2-69; 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 15:1, at
657; Ropski & Johnson, supra note 11, at 213-14.
A descriptive mark is "descriptive of: the intended purpose, function or use of the
goods; of the size of the goods, of the class of users of the goods, of a desirable character-
istic of the goods, or of the end effect upon the user." 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 1,
§ 11:5, at 442-43 (footnotes omitted). Examples of descriptive marks include Bufferin for
buffered aspirin, Food Fair for supermarkets, Lights for low tar and nicotine cigarettes,
Raisin-Bran for raisin and bran cereal and Vision Center for optical clinics. Id. at 449-
53.
76. 1 J. Gilson, supra note 16, § 2.09, at 2-68; 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 15:1, at
656; Ropski & Johnson, supra note 11, at 213.
"Arbitrary marks comprise those words, symbols, pictures, etc., which are in common
linguistic use but which, when used with the goods or services in issue, neither suggest
nor describe any ingredient, quality or characteristic of those goods or services." 1 J.
McCarthy, supra note 1, § 11:4, at 439. Examples of arbitrary marks include Command
for hair care products, Nova for a television series and Sun for a bank. Id. at 441.
"'Fanciful' marks consist of 'coined' words which have been invented for the sole pur-
pose of functioning as a trademark." Id. § 11:3, at 436. Clorox, Kodak and Kotex are
examples. Id. at 438. Suggestive marks "suggest[] some quality or ingredient of goods"
and must be distinguished from descriptive marks. Id. § 11:20, at 488. Suggestive marks
include Chicken of the Sea for tuna fish, Loc-Top for bottle closure caps, Playboy for a
magazine and Wrangler for western boots and jeans. Id. at 499-502.
77. See 1 J. Gilson, supra note 16, § 2.02, at 2-8.2 to 2-9; S. Kane, supra note 2, at 18;
1 J. McCarthy, supra note 1, §§ 12:1, 12:14, at 520, 560; Ropski & Johnson, supra note
11, at 214-15. "[G]eneric designations tell ... what the product is, not where it came
from." 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 12:1, at 520. Generic terms include aspirin, bras-
siere, cola, mart, shredded wheat and yo-yo. Id. § 12:4, at 533-37.
78. See Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 1986)
(it is "high time" that trademark law be applied to trade dress cases).
Indeed, trade dress cases often rely on holdings in trademark cases. Standards estab-
lished in trademark cases have been used to determine secondary meaning in trade dress
cases. See Vaughan Mfg. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing
A.J. Canfield Co. v. Vess Beverages, Inc., 796 F.2d 903, 908 (7th Cir. 1986)); Sno-Wizard
Mfg. v. Eisemann Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting Zatarains, Inc.
v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 795 (5th Cir. 1983)). For a discussion of
proof of secondary meaning, see infra notes 99-115 and accompanying text.
In determining inherent distinctiveness in trade dress cases, courts have relied on fac-
tors stated in a trademark case, Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d
1342, 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1977). See, e.g., Brooks Shoe Mfg. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d
854, 858 (11th Cir. 1983) (athletic shoes); Robarb, Inc. v. Pool Builders Supply of the
Carolinas, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 621, 624 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (pool cleaner bottles); Blue Coral,
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for the Seventh Circuit stated, "Labels should not determine rights."7 9
The similarities between trademarks and trade dress support the appli-
cation of trademark law to package design cases. Trade dress and trade-
marks both use the same classifications: generic, descriptive, suggestive
or arbitrary with distinctiveness increasing toward the suggestive and ar-
bitrary end of the classification range.8" Because package design involves
such an infinite variety of possible elements,"1 it is analogous to arbitrary,
fanciful and suggestive marks and, like those marks, inherent distinctive-
ness is a proper test for protection from infringement.8 2
The application of the inherent distinctiveness test to trade dress has
been criticized because the trade dress thus "seeks to avail itself of the
benefits... registration would have secured to it" without actually being
registered. 3 Unregistered trademarks, however, may be protected under
section 43(a) 4 and the inherent distinctiveness test has been applied to
them.8 5
B. Application of the Law of Unfair Competition to Package Design
Even if the similarities between trademarks and trade dress are not
accepted as a basis for applying the inherent distinctiveness test to pack-
age design, use of the test is still justified under the broader law of unfair
competition. 6 Commentators and courts have been unable to develop a
Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1153, 1161-62 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (containers for car
waxes and cleaners). For a discussion of the factors used to determine inherent distinc-
tiveness, see infra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
79. Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 1986).
80. AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1537 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1041 (1987); see Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 425 n.3 (5th
Cir. 1984); Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, 659 F.2d 695, 702 (5th
Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982).
81. See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. Product design is closer to a descrip-
tive trademark, rather than an arbitrary, fanciful or suggestive mark, because it is the
equivalent of descriptive words. See In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1051
(C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J., concurring); supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. De-
scriptive marks require secondary meaning and, therefore, requiring secondary meaning
for a product design is in keeping with trademark law. See supra note 75 and accompa-
nying text.
83. Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 843 (9th Cir. 1987)
(citation omitted).
84. See S. Kane, supra note 2, at 200; 2 J. McCarthy, supra note 10, § 27:3, at 345.
85. See Shen Mfg. Co. v. Suncrest Mills, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
86. The scope of unfair competition is greater than that of trademark infringement.
There is... a fundamental distinction.., between trade-mark infringement and
unfair competition. Trade-mark infringement rests on a relatively narrow prin-
ciple compared to unfair competition. The essential element of a trade-mark is
the exclusive right of its owner to use a word or device to distinguish his prod-
uct. On the other hand, a claim of unfair competition considers the total physi-
cal image given by the product and its name together. Thus, unfair competition
exists if the total impression of package, size, shape, color, design and name
upon the consumer will lead him to confuse the origin of the product.
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workable definition of unfair competition, and a determination of unfair
competition must be made on a case-by-case basis.87 The law of unfair
competition may be easiest to comprehend through its objectives, which
include "the promotion and encouragement of competition"88 and the
"prevent[ion ofj one person from passing off his goods or his business as
the goods or business of another." 9 Imitation may be considered unfair
competition,9" and consequently, the law of unfair competition protects
trade dress from infringement.9
A goal of the Lanham Act is to protect merchants and manufacturers
from unfair competition 92 and, as a result, section 43(a) has shifted most
unfair competition cases from state to federal courts since 1970. 9' One
way manufacturers compete is by using similar package designs, and
standards are necessary to determine whether this kind of competition is
unfair.94 Secondary meaning is one such standard, but it is often difficult
or impossible to prove.95 Thus, requiring secondary meaning as a prereq-
uisite to trade dress protection raises the risk of unfair competition. The
inherent distinctiveness test prevents the unfair competition that would
result from the copying of an unusual or unique package design when
secondary meaning cannot be proven.96
In guarding against unfair competition, fair competition must not be
restricted. Providing protection of inherently distinctive package and
display designs does not inhibit fair competition. The possible variations
of design elements for a display or package are virtually infinite in the
areas of fanciful, arbitrary and suggestive trade dress, 97 and the potential
Jean Patou, Inc. v. Jacqueline Cochran, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 861, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1962),
aff'd, 312 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1963); see Sun-Fun Prods., Inc. v. Suntan Research & Dev.
Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 192 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 1981); 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 8:1,
at 282-83. The emphasis on total image contained in this definition of the scope of unfair
competition echoes the importance of total image in the definition of trade dress. See
supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
87. See 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 1:3-4, at 12-16.
88. Id. § 1:1, at 2.
89. American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 380 (1926).
90. See 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 1:1, at 4.
91. See Vaughan Mfg. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 347 n.1 (7th Cir. 1987);
Fabrica Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 894 (9th Cir. 1983); 1 J. McCarthy, supra
note 1, § 1:5, at 16; Schuman supra note 8, at 781.
92. See Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
93. See I J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 1:9, at 24-25. Section 43(a) is not limited to
trademark infringement and includes all forms of unfair competition. See Blau Plumb-
ing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 1986).
94. See 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 8:1, at 282-85.
95. Schuman, supra note 8, at 807; see infra notes 99-115 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text regarding the difficulty of proving
secondary meaning based on intentional copying.
97. The use of the inherent distinctiveness test has been justified in a trade dress case
because "[tihe wide range of available packaging and design options allows a producer to
appropriate a distinctive identity without unduly hindering his competitors' ability to
compete." Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 426 n.7 (5th Cir. 1984).
However, due to their general use and the resultant lack of identity with a source of
goods, common colors and shapes do not qualify as inherently distinctive trade dress and
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negative effects of a design monopoly being created by application of the
inherent distinctiveness test do not exist.9 8
C. Additional Arguments for Use of the Inherent Distinctiveness Test
for Package Design Protection
Whether application of the inherent distinctiveness test to trade dress
is based on trademark law or the law of unfair competition, additional
arguments suppport inherent distinctiveness as a test for product design
protection.
1. Difficulty of Proving Secondary Meaning
In litigation, the party claiming trade dress protection based on the
secondary meaning test has the burden of proof,99 and secondary mean-
ing is sometimes very difficult and costly to prove." ° Limiting trade
dress protection to the secondary meaning test could make it impossible
to provide protection for package and display designs that, otherwise,
would easily be adjudged inherently distinctive. There are three basic
methods of proving secondary meaning and each presents its own pitfalls
and roadblocks to the protection of trade dress.
First, market survey data may be the most effective way of proving
secondary meaning if the survey shows the trade dress has established
the necessary connection between the producer and the product in the
mind of the consuming public. 10' However, the expense of a survey
could deter a trade dress owner from seeking protection for his trade
dress. 102 Even if one can afford to conduct a survey, they are difficult to
design and may not be successful. 10 3 To be admissible as evidence, a
survey must be conducted according to generally accepted market re-
search principles and the results must be used according to proper statis-
tical methods."°
are not protected unless secondary meaning is proven. See Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S.
Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 610 (7th Cir. 1986); Freixenet, S.A. v. Admiral Wine & Liquor
Co., 731 F.2d 148, 153 (3d Cir. 1984); 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 7:8, at 202.
98. See Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 844 (9th Cir.
1987); Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, 659 F.2d 695, 702-03 (5th
Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982); Perfect Fit Indus. v. Acme
Quilting Co., 618 F.2d 950, 953 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying New York law), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 832 (1982).
99. 20th Century Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust, Inc., 815 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1987).
100. See Palladino, Techniques for Ascertaining If There Is Secondary Meaning, 73
Trademark Rep. 391, 404 (1983); infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
101. See Sno-Wizard Mfg. v. Eisemann Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 1986)
(quoting Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 795 (5th Cir.
1983) (trademark infringement case)).
102. 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 1, § 15:14, at 691.
103. Palladino, supra note 100, at 404.
104. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 522-23 (10th Cir.
1987) (defendant alleged "technical and methodological deficiencies" in survey); First
Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1383 (9th Cir. 1987) (flawed survey
"biased respondents, did not control for guessing, and failed to take into account the
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A consumer survey may not be necessary if other evidence sufficiently
indicates that consumers would associate the trade dress with a pro-
ducer.105 A large volume of sales or extensive advertising that features
the trade dress is the second way of proving secondary meaning.10 6 Ex-
tensive advertising, however, will not prove secondary meaning if the
trade dress is not prominently featured in the advertisements or promo-
tional efforts. 10 7
Finally, deliberate attempts by one producer to capitalize on the secon-
dary meaning of another's trade dress by imitating that trade dress may
be evidence of secondary meaning. 10 This method of proof, however,
presents problems. Intentional copying alone may not be enough to es-
tablish secondary meaning because the imitator's primary reason for
copying a trade dress may not have been to benefit from the secondary
meaning of another's trade dress.10 9 A product's trade dress may be cop-
ied because of its attractive or innovative design without any intention of
taking advantage of consumer recognition, or competitors may copy
functional features that lack secondary meaning.110 In addition, the fact
that a competitor had the intent to imitate may be difficult to prove. 11
Use of intentional imitation as proof of secondary meaning creates an
strong association of the brand name.., with [the class of product] in general"); Sno-
Wizard Mfg. v. Eisemann Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 1986) (survey results
failed to establish secondary meaning due to erroneous interpretation of results and bi-
ased interview techniques); see also 5 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence %
901(b)(9)[03], at 901-115 to -120 (1983). For an in-depth discussion of how to design
questions to measure secondary meaning, see Palladino, supra note 100.
105. See Vaughan Mfg. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing
A.J. Canfield Co. v. Vess Beverages, Inc., 796 F.2d 903, 908 (7th Cir. 1986) (trademark
case)); LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 78 (2d Cir. 1985).
106. See Vaughan, 814 F.2d at 349; First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d
1378, 1383 (9th Cir. 1987); LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 78.
107. See First Brands, 809 F.2d at 1383; AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531,
1540 n.40 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). Cf Aloe Creme Labs.,
Inc. v. Milsan, Inc., 423 F.2d 845, 850 (5th Cir.) (effectiveness, not extent, of promotional
efforts establishes secondary meaning in trademark case), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928
(1970).
108. See, e.g., Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 844 (9th
Cir. 1987) ("evidence of deliberate copying is relevant to a determination of secondary
meaning"); M. Kramer Mfg. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 448 (4th Cir. 1986) ("evidence of
intentional, direct copying establishes a prima facie case of secondary meaning" and
shifts the burden to defendant to prove lack of secondary meaning); Blau Plumbing, Inc.
v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 611 (7th Cir. 1986) (adoption by defendant of plain-
tiff's trade dress because he thinks it has acquired secondary meaning is an inference of
secondary meaning); see also Strimbeck, supra note 9, at 89-91, 93 (not necessary to prove
secondary meaning if the alleged infringer intended to copy).
109. Brooks Shoe Mfg. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854, 859-60 (11th Cir. 1983)
(quoting 1 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 15:4, at 531 (1973)).
110. See Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doe's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 844-45 (9th Cir.
1987).
111. See Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 611 (7th Cir. 1986)
("evidence of intent [to copy] is often ambiguous"); Falcon Rice Mill, Inc. v. Community
Rice Mill, Inc., 725 F.2d 336, 346-47 (5th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff lacked direct evidence of
intent to copy).
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economic problem as well. Providing protection to the source of an in-
tentionally imitated trade dress permits "the first seller of a product [to]
appropriate the simplest of trade dress, the most elementary of descrip-
tive terms, and there[by] make it more costly for the next seller to com-
pete with him." '' n
The stringent requirements of each of the three methods result in a
heavy burden on the party seeking to prove secondary meaning.1 1 3 In
J.M. Huber Corp. v. Lowery Wellheads, Inc.,"' for example, despite evi-
dence that the plaintiff had used a trade dress for thirty-four years, sold
$45 million worth of products bearing the trade dress in a ten-year pe-
riod, spent about $500,000 in advertising, and distributed about 12,000
catalogs, he was unable to convince the court that secondary -meaning
had been acquired. 1 5 The heavy burden of proving secondary meaning,
even when the package design is inherently distinctive, runs contrary to
the legislative intent of the Lanham Act to protect consumers from imi-
tated marks and to protect the goodwill and investment of manufacturers
and merchants. 1 6 The alternative test of inherent distinctiveness pro-
vides potential protection for trade dress that would otherwise be left
unprotected because of the difficulty of proving secondary meaning.
2. Inherent Distinctiveness Test Standards
The acceptance of an inherent distinctiveness test acknowledges that
an unusual design will quickly lead to the association of a trade dress
with a source of origin. However, the degree of distinctiveness must be
extraordinary to justify the use of the inherent distinctiveness test. 17
The problem with this test has been to express standards that sufficiently
denote the high degree of distinctiveness necessary for a package design
to become an identifier of source.
Courts rejecting the inherent distinctiveness test seem unable to com-
prehend how inherent distinctiveness can be an identifier of source. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, for example, considers it
anomolous to find a false designation of origin or false representation
without a showing of secondary meaning because "there would be no
112. Blau Plumbing, 781 F.2d at 611.
113. 20th Century Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust, Inc., 815 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1987).
114. 778 F.2d 1467 (10th Cir. 1985).
115. Id. at 1470 (no secondary meaning proven due to lack of "market survey data or
other empirical evidence"); see also S. Kane, supra note 2, at 50 (courts and adversaries
can be expected to note absence of surveys). In LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754
F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1985), "proof of phenomenal sales success, substantial advertising ex-
penditures, unsolicited media coverage, [licensing] requests... and [defendant's] deliber-
ate attempt to imitate" was considered not necessarily sufficient to prove secondary
meaning. See id. at 78.
116. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
117. See In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1051 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J., con-
curring) ("the more unusual the design"); Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34
UCLA L. Rev. 1341, 1379 (1987) ("remarkable distinction").
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standard against which to measure such falsity.""'  The Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that a trade dress owner failed
to provide an explanation of how inherent distinctiveness can be an indi-
cator of source in the absence of secondary meaning, despite the "intui-
tive appeal" of his argument. 119 The argument against the inherent
distinctiveness test has been best summarized by a commentator who
stated that a determination of inherent distinctiveness is "an impermissi-
ble exercise of intuitive judging. It substitutes an impression that the
design is outstanding ... for the proofs ... of secondary meaning."' 120
Definable standards, however, have been developed and implemented.
To evaluate the inherent distinctiveness of a trade dress, the design must
be examined to determine whether it is unique and not a basic shape or
merely a refinement of the ornamentation normally found on a type of
product.' 2 ' Although these factors may be more difficult to apply in
package design cases than in trademark cases because of the need to con-
sider the total appearance of trade dress,' 2 they have been successfully
applied in trade dress cases. 123
Basic shapes or common designs, such as geometric shapes used in
advertising or common elements of restaurant decor are not inherently
distinctive.124 Uniqueness may determine whether a product's trade
dress is inherently distinctive, although individual package designs have
frequently been held not unique.' 25 Ornamentation lacks inherent dis-
tinctiveness if it is merely a variation of decoration commonly used for a
type of goods, such as "stripes, bars and designs" on athletic shoes.'26
118. Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique, 652 F.2d 299, 303 (2d Cir. 1981)
(quoting Germain, Unfair Trade Practices Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act:
You've Come a Long Way, Baby-Too Far, Maybe?, 49 Ind. L.J. 84, 103 (1973)), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982).
119. See Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 843 (9th Cir.
1987). Many other cases simply state that secondary meaning is the appropriate test
without rejecting or acknowledging the possibility of the inherent distinctiveness test.
See, e.g., First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1987);
Stormy Clime Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 974 (2d Cir. 1987); American Greet-
ings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1141 (3d Cir. 1986).
120. Brown, supra note 117, at 1380.
121. See Brooks Shoe Mfg. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854, 858 (11th Cir. 1983)
(quoting Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 1344 (C.C.P.A.
1977) (trademark case)).
122. Blue Coral, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1153, 1163 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
123. See, e.g., Brooks Shoe Mfg. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854, 858 (11th Cir.
1983) (athletic shoes); Robarb, Inc. v. Pool Builders Supply of the Carolinas, Inc., 696 F.
Supp. 621, 624 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (pool cleaner bottles); Blue Coral, Inc. v. Turtle Wax,
Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1153, 1161-62 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (containers for car waxes and cleaners).
124. See Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 844 (9th Cir.
1987); Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 610-11 (7th Cir. 1986).
125. See Robarb, Inc. v. Pool Builders Supply of the Carolinas, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 621,
624 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (pool cleaner bottles held not unique); Blue Coral, Inc. v. Turtle
Wax, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1153, 1162 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (uniqueness of containers for car
waxes and cleaners assessed).
126. See Brooks Shoe Mfg. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854, 858 & n.10 (11th Cir.
1983).
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When considering these factors to determine inherent distinctiveness, the
importance of the overall appearance of a trade dress, not its constituent
elements, must be emphasized. 127
CONCLUSION
The Lanham Act provides protection for trade dress, which includes
product design and package design. A distinction must be drawn, how-
ever, between these two categories. The inherent distinctiveness test
should not be applied to determine whether a trade dress that consists of
product design should be protected from infingement. Secondary mean-
ing is the only appropriate test in that case because application of the
inherent distinctiveness test improperly expands trade dress protection
into areas reserved for copyrights and patents.
The inherent distinctiveness test is, however, proper for trade dress
consisting of package and display design. Because of the numerous pos-
sibilities for package and display design, application of the inherent dis-
tinctiveness test to this type of trade dress does not restrict competition.
To the extent that trade dress identifies a source, it functions as a trade-
mark, whether registered or unregistered, and the same tests that are
used for trademarks should apply to protect package and display design
from unprivileged copying.
William F Gaske
127. See, e.g., Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, 659 F.2d 695, 703
(5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981) ("the combination of particular hues of... colors, arranged
in certain geometric designs, presented in conjunction with a particular style of printing
. create a distinctive visual impression"), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982); Hartford
House Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1533, 1539 (D. Colo. 1986) (inherently
distinctive "look" based on the combination of ten elements), aff'd, 846 F.2d 1268 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 260 (1988); Isaly Co. v. Kraft, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 983, 989
(M.D. Fla. 1985) ("[Plaintiff's trade dress] is a complex composite of size, color, texture
and graphics which must be considered together ... not separately, in determining dis-
tinctiveness."), aff'd in relevant part sub nom. AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 805 F.2d 974
(11th Cir.); modified, 812 F.2d 1531, 1537 (1lth Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041
(1987).
However, an exception to the general rule that elements of trade dress should not be
considered individually occurs when "third party use of one or more ... elements of a
plaintiff's trade dress... is so extensive and so similar to the plaintiff's that it impairs the
ability of consumers to use the trade dress of the products to identify their source." Am-
Brit, 812 F.2d at 1537.
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